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I Knew It Was Me: Mass Media,

"Globalization," and Lesbian

and Gay Indonesians

Introduction: Agency, Globalization, Authenticity

One long afternoon I sat on the cool tile floor of a lower-class home in Surabaya, in Indonesia's East Java province, speaking about gay life with Darta, a large man in his early thirties. We were alone in the main room, but family members, all Muslim like Darta himself, bustled about nearby. I realized that because we were speaking Indonesian, they could be listening in on the conversation, yet Darta did not seem bothered. I looked up at him, a typically gentle smile on his face as he reclined on a sofa, and asked, "Does your family know about you?" Darta answered, "Yeah, they know that I have sex with men. It's no problem. They don't say it's a sin or anything. After they read magazines, they knew and understood, and accepted me."

"What magazines did they read?" I asked.

"Women's magazines, like Kartini. Those magazines always have gossip columns. So that's how they knew."

"When did you hear about gay for the first time?"

"I also read about it from magazines. It was in fifth or sixth grade [ca. 1985], on the island of Ambon where I grew up. It was there that I first heard about lesbi. Earlier, you know, gay wasn't around yet [gay belum ada]. But lesbi was already in women's magazines ... and I read lots of those magazines because Mom was a regular subscriber. Mom and I loved reading the articles on sexual deviants. I was always effeminate, and one day she even said I was lesbi! Because she didn't know the term gay; the term wasn't
public back then. But eventually I learned the term gay as well [dapat gay juga]. That was also from a magazine. There was some story about historic English royalty... Richard someone. When I saw that, I thought 'There're others like me.'

In my fieldwork in Indonesia, Dart's calling himself lesbi for several years before learning the term gay is unique. However, the central role mass media played in the process by which he came to occupy a gay subject-position is typical. In relation to the rubric of this volume, it is particularly interesting to note that, like Darta, I find forms of ostensibly "old" mass media, particularly print forms such as magazines, more significant than "new" electronic or digital media in the dissemination of the lesbi and gay subject-positions in Indonesia. It is a truism that mass media are also crucial to "Western" queer sexualities; by definition, nonnormative sexual subject-positions are rarely discovered through "tradition" or the family. However, mass media in Asia have taken a variety of pathways different from Western ones, compelling queer Asians and their outsider allies (like myself) to query the role of new and old mass media in queer subject-positions, erotic sensibilities, and politicized identities. This is the problematic with which the various essays in this volume concern themselves in some fashion.

With this theoretical horizon in mind, in this essay I ask a specific question but proffer a broad answer. The question is: How do certain people in contemporary Indonesia, the world's fourth-largest country by population after China, India, and the United States, come to occupy the subject-positions lesbi and gay, which appear to originate in the West? The answer: what I call "dubbing culture." Extending the productive representation of cultural logics as "discourses," this labels a contingent process by which incomplete mass-mediated messages animate a sexual self felt to be fully modern and authentic, yet at a disjuncture from the local. I therefore pose the problem of lesbi and gay subject-positions in terms of translation, leaving lesbi and gay in italics. Lesbi and gay have their own history and dynamics: they are not just "lesbian" and "gay" with a foreign accent. Although shaped by globalizing mass media, these subject-positions are not simply "reruns" of Western ones.

Three issues are of particular importance to this discussion and the understanding of queer Asia more generally. The first has to do with im-

Tom Boellstorff
lesbi? Finally, we short-circuit our ability to develop a culturally respectful queer politics.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the darkly humorous trajectory of “human rights” discourse. In Indonesia as elsewhere in Asia, human rights has largely replaced development as the concept of choice to be applied unthinkingly to every circumstance of oppression, as if it were a transparent idea, with no history and no cultural assumptions built into it. As a good Western subject I love the idea of human rights; it makes sense to me because I was raised in a culture founded in the liberal ideology of the autonomous subject, with natural abilities and desires, that human rights also presupposes. In Indonesia, however, human rights is known as hak asasi manusia, referred to in both print and speech by its acronym HAM. This in an environment where 90 percent of Indonesians are Muslim (and thus forbidden to eat pork) and the meaning of English ham is so well-known that across Indonesia, McDonalds and other fast food chains refer to hamburgers as beefburgers.

This anecdote points up a more foundational problem: for many Indonesians, human rights are seen as something Christians get, a conclusion they see confirmed in the inconsistent interventionist policies of Christian-dominated Western powers (including the United States, but Australia above all in the wake of the independence of Timor Loroêne, formerly East Timor). Indonesians are not paranoid; at times such governments (particularly the United States) voice a preference for protecting the human rights of Christians. The link between human rights discourse and totalitarianism, founded in the fact that human rights discourse requires assuming a “bare humanity” abstracted from social context, was first noted by Arendt half a century ago. Without a notion of human rights that does not assume the Western liberal subject, I fear that human rights discourse in Asia will either become co-opted by state forces or rejected as incompatible with “Asian values.” Similarly, without a more nuanced notion of agency, our analyses of sexuality and mass media will remain in a register of boosterism bearing little connection to the real-world experiences of queer Asians.

There seems to be no easy resolution: navigating between structure and agency remains one of the most vexing and productive dilemmas in social theory. It is with such orienteering in mind that in this essay I recount a recent debate concerning the dubbing of imported television shows into the Indonesian language. From this debate I draw the term dubbing, which I then extend metaphorically to think about how ostensibly “foreign” mass-mediated messages can be reconfigured at the point of what otherwise might be called “reception.” Just as the dubbed television show in which “Sharon Stone speaks Indonesian” does not “originate” in the United States, so gay and lesbi subject-positions are distinctively Indonesian phenomena. Yet, just as the range of possibilities for a dubbed soundtrack is shaped by images originating elsewhere, so a “dubbed” subject-position, and the persons who occupy that position in some fashion, cannot choose their subjectivities just as they please. I move, then, from a literal, technical meaning of dubbing to a more speculative, analogical use as a way to approach the relationship between social actors and the modes of subjectivization by which such individuals come to occupy subject-positions. I trace this metaphorical use of dubbing culture to the domain of mass media, but it is pertinent to questions about postcoloniality and authenticity more generally.

A brief aside on terminology. I speak of subject-positions (extant social categories of selfhood) and subjectivities (the various senses of self: erotics, assumptions about one’s life course, etc. that obtain when occupying a subject-position [partially or completely, temporarily or permanently]). I use identity, identity, and self-identification in a more limited fashion, referring to explicit (often explicitly politicized) claims to membership in lesbi or gay as indices of community. In speaking of Indonesians who use the terms lesbi and gay (or close equivalents), de-emphasizing identity is useful because it helps avoid a behaviorist approach (frequent in studies of erotics and sexuality) that sees behavior as preceding and determining identity. Identity versus behavior is a false dichotomy: identity is not simply a cognitive map but also a set of embodied practices, and behavior is always culturally mediated through self-narrative. As a result, focusing on subject-positions and subjectivities turns attention to the total social fact of gay and lesbi selfhood.

One important advantage of this theoretical framework of subject-positions and subjectivities is that it cross-cuts and indeed deconstructs the identity behavior binarism, as subject-positions and subjectivities each have both ideational and material aspects (a subject-position can be formed and sustained through not only ideology but also architecture; a subjectivity lived not just through belief but also through fashion). This is basically a Foucauldian framework that draws from the epistemological “break” between volumes 1 and 2 of The History of Sexuality, wherein Foucault
shifted from an emphasis on "the formation of sciences" about sexuality and the "systems of power" inciting sexuality to "the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as subjects of desire, bringing into play between themselves and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being."

I think of subject-position as a rough translation of jiwa, which means "soul" in Indonesian but often has a collective meaning; lesbi women will sometimes say "Lesbi have the same jiwa"; male-to-female transvestites (varia, bana) will say they "have the same jiwa"; and lesbi women and gay men will sometimes say they share a jiwa. I think of subjectivity as a rough translation of prabadi (or jati diri), both of which mean roughly "self-conception": a gay man once distinguished prabadi from jiwa by saying that "every person possesses their own prabadi." Interestingly, identitas has a much more experience-distant, bureaucratic ring for most Indonesians: one gay man defined identitas as "biodata: name, address, and so on" (biodata nama, alamat, dan sebaganya).

This problem of agency underlies the second issue at stake in a dubbing culture analysis of queer Asia: the presentation of global capitalism as absolute, on the part of both global capitalism and its critics. Gibson-Graham, in a feminist critique of globalization narratives, note their similarity to rape narratives: both present a masculinized entity (the rapist, or global capitalism) as always already in a position of dominance, and a feminized entity (the rape victim, or the local) in a position of weakness. This is more than a metaphorical parallel: as narratives about relationality and transfer, stories of sexuality are always also stories of globalization and vice versa.

Like Gibson-Graham, who hopes that "a queer perspective can help to unsettle the consonances and interferences of the narrative of global commodification," in this essay I present globalization "losing its erection" and susceptible to transformation. In queering globalization in this manner, we do not lose sight of the immense suffering and injustice it causes. Instead, we highlight that this suffering and injustice is caused not by a singular globalization but by a complex network of interlocking economic, political, and social forces, forces that are not always in agreement and not always in absolute dominance. In terms of the dubbing metaphor, we might say that the voice of globalization is powerful, but that voice does not "move" across the globe, it is dialogically reconstituted. It is in a constant state of dubbing.

As a result, the very notion of cross-cultural research must be rethought when the cultures in question have been "crossing" in advance of the ethnographic encounter.

A third issue at stake is that of authenticity. Most analyses of queer sexualities in Asia fall into one of two reductionisms: either queer Asians are seen as autochthonous bearers of "traditional" same-sex and transgendered identities masked by Western terms, or they are traitors to tradition, duped by the West and victims of global gay imperialism. Such a stark binarism harks back to the larger concerns with "derivative discourse" that appear in many discussions of postcoloniality and bespeaks the same liberal framework underlying assumptions about agency and globalization noted earlier. It provides little help in understanding the richly textured relationships of affinity and opposition that characterize the bonds between queer Asians and mass media. In particular, what makes these relationships between sexuality and mass media theoretically compelling is not that the mass media in question are new (e.g., cell phones and the Internet versus print media), but the complex interface between sexuality and mass media on the one hand, and representation, reconfiguration, and authenticity on the other.

A theory of dubbing culture contributes toward a more grounded understanding of the imbrication of queer Asian subject-positions with mass media. It reframes these issues through a lens of translation, asking how the unintended reconfiguration of mass-mediated messages can result in subject-positions experienced as authentic even as they link with "distant" messages. For this reason, the social practice of dubbing is the key word of this essay. (Dubbing here means taking a "foreign" film or television show and adding a new spoken soundtrack, such as dubbing a French movie into English.)

As in any dub, I weave two things into one, bringing together gay and lesbi subject-positions with a debate over dubbing in Indonesia. I hope to provide a sense of my own serendipitous realization that these two issues are interlinked—and that dubbing provides a crucial clue to understanding the lifeworlds of gay and lesbi Indonesians. In the first section below, I examine the important role of globalizing mass media in their lives, and in the second juxtapose this with the 1996–1998 dubbing controversy. In the final section, I dub the earlier sections to arrive at a theory of dubbing.
cultural exchange and interaction across cultures and regions. A theory that I hope to contribute to understanding not only lesbi and gay subject-positions, but mass-mediated subject-positions elsewhere in Asia and beyond. The contribution of a theory of deconstructing culture lies in better conceptualizing the mobility of cultural forms themselves—the ways in which the movement of culture takes place, is always already caught up in cultural logics concerning what counts as movement and an object for movement.12

The “Problem” of Gay and Lesbi Subj ectivities

The most enduring Western stereotype regarding homosexuality and transgenderism in Indonesia (and Southeast Asia more generally) is that these regions are “tolerant.” It is true that there have been—and in some cases, still are—socially recognized roles for male-to-female transgenders, as well as widespread acceptance of secretive homosexual behavior, but transgenderism and homosexuality are hardly valorized in contemporary Indonesian society. Although homosexuality and transgenderism usually escape official comment, religious and state authorities, if asked, swiftly condemn both as sinful and incompatible with “Indonesian tradition.” One goal of this essay is to speak to the realities of homosexual and transgendered life without resorting to romanticized views of Indonesian tradition.

“Indonesian tradition” is, in any case, a problematic concept, as Indonesia is primarily the former territorial boundary of the Netherlands East Indies, a Dutch colony from the 1500s until the Second World War (some parts of which did not fall under actual Dutch control until a few decades before the war). Indonesia is in fact made up of approximately 670 ethnological groups (the Javanese, the Balinese, the Bugis, etc.), many of whom had little in common before the colonial encounter and then the beginnings of the nationalist movement in the early twentieth century. However, in the almost sixty years since Indonesia’s independence, a national culture has taken root with remarkable swiftness.

Readers unfamiliar with Indonesianist anthropology may be surprised to learn that although scholars of nationalism have convincingly shown how Indonesia is a signal case of an “imagined community,”13 this national culture is rarely studied ethnographically; Indonesianist anthropology has tended to study what I term “ethnolocal” cultural formations. In Indonesia’s current period of crisis, marked by new rhetorics of “ethnic absolutism,”14 there is an urgent need to understand how national culture is for many Indonesians not a state imposition but intimately authentic and meaningful.

It is with the goal of better understanding this national culture that since 1992 I have conducted fieldwork on three islands: Java, Bali, and Sulawesi. In accordance with my emphasis on translocal culture, I do not see this work as comparative; while interested in similarities and differences among my sites, I view them primarily as elements of one site—Indonesia—in much the same way that an ethnographer studying a single city might portray three different neighborhoods as elements of that one city. I also focus not on ethnolocalized homosexual and transgender professional subject-positions (i.e., so-called traditional or ritual sexualities and transgenders), but on three sexual subject-positions that are national in scope: gay, lesbi, and waria. As I primarily address gay and lesbi in this essay, I first briefly situate waria in their cultural context.15

National Transvestites

The persons are better known to the Indonesian public with the rather derogatory terms banci or béncing, but themselves tend to prefer waria, an amalgam of wanita (female) and pria (male) coined in the early 1970s.16 A succinct definition of waria is male-to-female transvestites. I use “transvestite” rather than “transgender” because most waria see themselves not as becoming female, but as men who have the souls of women from birth, dress as women much of the time, and have sex with men.

In contemporary Indonesia waria are truly national (they can be from any ethnicity or religion) and are much more visible than gay or lesbi Indonesians. Many dress as women twenty-four hours a day, but even those who do not are readily identifiable by most Indonesians due to their effeminate appearance (tweezed eyebrows, long hair, effeminate movements and speech). In any Indonesian city and even in rural areas, you can encounter waria on the street or in a park looking for sex work clients. Above all, you will find waria working at salons, and you would certainly hope to have a waria do the makeup and hairstyling for your daughter on her wedding day. It is this transformative power of waria to change the public appearance of others (in line with their ability to change their own public appearance) that is their ilmu, their great skill, in Indonesian society, and
waria cite this as the reason they should be valued (not because of a liberal notion of human rights that argues for validation based on identity alone). Waria are part of the recognized social mosaic.

The public position of waria extends to mass media and other public fora. You can see them in television comedy shows and Bayer aspirin commercials and performing at amusement parks and Independence Day celebrations. In all of these contexts waria are construed as artful and skilled in beauty and as silly, worthy targets of disdain. In other words, although waria are acknowledged elements of contemporary Indonesian society, they are hardly celebrated. The Western liberal assumption that to be public and visible implies acceptance does not hold here. The parents of waria usually accept this fact and release the waria from the imperative to marry; some, though, are thrown out of the family forever. Waria have been held under water by angry fathers until they have almost drowned, have been tormented, stabbed, and killed by street youths, and have died of AIDS on an island far from home, rejected by their own family. This is not always the case: many waria have carefree lives of steady income and relative social acceptance, and in many respects the condition of waria is better than that of transgenders, lesbians, or gay men in much of the West. All in all, however, it seems difficult to hold up Indonesia as a transgendered nirvana.

Gay and Lesbi Indonesia

Most Indonesians still confuse gay and waria, supposing that the former is an English rendition of the latter. Gay men and waria do not share this confusion, but they do see each other as sharing something: both inhabit alternative masculinities and both are sexually attracted to men. Few gay men, however, speak of themselves as having a woman's soul; not all are effeminate, and none dress like women all of the time (though many gay men dêdong or “do drag” for entertainment purposes). Like waria, many gay men work in salons, but because they are poorly visible to Indonesian society they can also be found in other professions, from the highest levels of government to street sweepers. Indeed, if one common Western misconception about Indonesia (and Asia more generally) is that transgenders are valued members of society, another misconception is that gay men and lesbian women are products of the executive, jet-setting classes. Here the cultural effects of globalization are thought to correlate with class in a linear fashion: the richer you are, the more you are affected by globalization, and thus the less authentic you are. The proletarian becomes the new indigene. However, as any Nike factory worker in Indonesia could tell you, class is poorly correlated with the degree to which someone is impacted by globalizing forces. And indeed, gay men in Indonesia are primarily lower class (90 percent of my informants make less than $60 a month), do not speak English, have never traveled outside Indonesia, and have never met a Westerner before myself, gay or otherwise.

A significant element of lesbi subject-positions is the division between persons who see themselves as women who desire sex with other women and typically appear normatively feminine (usually known as lesbi or lines, which is a gay language transformation of lesbi), and female-bodied persons who desire sex with women but who can see themselves either as masculine women or as female-to-male transgenders (usually known as tomboy or hunter). Tomboy tend to dress as men twenty-four hours a day; unless they speak, many are mistaken for men on the street. Tomboy and waria sometimes say that they are “closer” to each other than either are to gay men or lesbi women, because tomboy and waria both see themselves as having the soul of one gender but the body of another, and because both are usually visibly nonnormative in gender presentation.

Although the dynamics of tomboy and lesbi subjectivities might appear to conform to “butch-femme” role playing as understood (and often criticized) in the West, this is not a simple importation. At issue is that the concepts lesbi and gay have translated to Indonesia in a context where there is no socially salient female-to-male equivalent to the waria subject-position. Gay, understood as male homosexuality, is thus clearly differentiated from the preexisting waria subject-position (and where gay men and waria are rarely sexual partners); the categories of female homosexuality and female-to-male transgenderism are more imbricated, and lesbi and tomboy are ideal sexual partners.

The social bonds among lesbi women, tomboy, waria, and gay men are important to my fieldwork and this analysis. It is true that gay men often find themselves spending more social time with waria than with lesbi women, because gay men and waria both see themselves as alternative masculinities. Similarly, tomboy and lesbi women interact more with each other than with gay men or waria, because they see themselves not only as alternative femininities but as ideal sexual partners. However, there is also much interaction between gay men and lesbi women. In all three of my field
sites. *tomboy, gay men, waria, and lesbi* women work sometimes side by side in salons and activist organizations or spend time together in everyday interaction.

When I began my fieldwork, I worried that it would be difficult to “access” lesbians. I had been told that it was not possible to study gay men and lesbian women in the same project. As my work progressed, however, I realized that the politics of gender play differently in Indonesia than in the United States. The issue was not one of access as Westerners might think of that term, but simply that the social spaces in which *tomboy* and *lesbi* women move overlap only partially with those of gay men and *waria*. Once I was able to familiarize myself with those spaces, I was not only able to interview a large number of *lesbi* women and *tomboy*, but was able to engage in activism with them.

*Gay and Lesbi Subjectivities and Mass Media*

How do Indonesians come to the idea that they could be *lesbi* or *gay*? This “problem” seems salient to Western observers because, unlike *waria*, gay and *lesbi* are not concepts with significant historical depth; they appear to have first arisen in the 1970s. Additionally, *gay* and *lesbi* remain obscure to most Indonesians. Whether tolerated or condemned, *waria* are well-known members of society. The concepts *gay* and *lesbi*, however, are at present not passed down in either a positive or negative light; they remain unknown, or regarded as English equivalents of *waria*. Even *gay* men and *lesbi* women who went to elementary school in the late 1980s or early 1990s heard in the schoolyard primarily terms for *waria* such as *banci*, but rarely *gay* or *lesbi*.

How do these subjectivities take hold in the hearts of so many Indonesians?

There is no single answer. A few Indonesians say that they first learned of the possibility of *gay* and *lesbi* subject-positions when told about the terms by a friend. A few *gay* men say that they first knew of *gay* after wandering into a public area frequented by *gay* men, and a few *gay* men and *lesbi* women say that they became aware of the concepts after being seduced. However, only a small fraction of Indonesians learn of *gay* or *lesbi* subject-positions through all these routes to erotic knowledge combined.

Another possibility is that since the early 1980s, *gay* men and *lesbi* women have been informally publishing small magazines. These zines might play a “conduit” role, importing and transmitting Western concepts of sexuality. However, not a single informant ever cited these zines as the means by which they came to know of *lesbi* or *gay* subject-positions. The primary reason for this is that Indonesians seem to access these zines only after first thinking of themselves as *lesbi* or *gay*. It is also clear that *gay* and *lesbi* subject-positions existed for at least ten years prior to the appearance of the first zine (in 1982). Although impacting the subjectivities of those who read them, these zines do not play a formative role. This may not remain the case in the future, particularly as greater access freedoms and increasing Internet access make these zines more accessible, yet neither they nor the other modes mentioned above explain how Indonesians have come to occupy the subject-positions *lesbi* and *gay*.

*The Answer: Mass Media*

Recall that *gay* and *lesbi* Indonesians are “problematic” because they are poorly visible to contemporary Indonesian society and absent from all “traditions.” How do so many Indonesians come to occupy subject-positions that are not despised so much as ignored?

The answer: nearly 95 percent of my *gay* and *lesbi* informants cite regular mass media as the means by which they first knew they could understand themselves through the concepts *lesbi* or *gay*. This is true whether the persons in question are from Java, Bali, Sulawesi, or other islands; whether they are Muslim, Christian, Hindu, or Buddhist; whether they are wealthy, middle class, or impoverished; whether they live in cities or rural areas; and whether they were born in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s. Rarely is it a cultural variable distributed so widely across such a diverse population. This finding is all the more notable when we compare the life narratives of *lesbi* women and *gay* men with *waria*. I have *never* heard *waria* cite mass media as the means by which they first saw themselves as *waria*; *waria* learn of the *waria* subject-position from their social environs—schoolkids on the playground, a cousin or neighbor—but not from mass media. Darta’s story rehearses a common story of discovery that most *gay* and *lesbi* Indonesians see as a pivotal moment in their life, one they recall without hesitation, as in the case of the following Javanese Christian man in Surabaya:

In elementary school the only word was *banci* [waria]. For instance, a boy who walked or acted like a girl would get teased with the word *banci*. So I didn’t know about the word *gay* until junior high. I heard it from books, magazines, television. And I wanted to know! I looked for information; if I
saw that a magazine had an article about *homo.* I'd be sure to read it. I knew then that a *homo* was a man who liked men. But I didn't know that *homo* meant *gay* at that time. So I tried to find out from books and things like that. I learned all of that stuff from the mass media. ... So having someone come and tell me "It's like this," that never happened. I learned it all through magazines and newspapers. ... And when I read those things, I knew that I was *gay.*

For this man, *homo* is an impersonalized descriptive category, whereas *gay* is a framework for understanding the self’s past motivations, immediate desires, and visions of an unfolding future. Abdurol, a Muslim man who grew up in a small town in Sulawesi, tells the following story:

**TE:** When you were in your teenage years, did you already know the term *gay?*

**A:** In my environment at that time, most people didn't yet know. But because I read a lot, read a lot of news, I already knew. I already knew that I was gay. Through reading I knew about the gay world. ...  

**TE:** What kinds of magazines?  

**A:** Gossip magazines, you know, they always talk about such-and-such a star and the rumors that the person is gay. So that broadened my concepts [wawasan], made me realize "Oh, there are others like me."

Because *lesbi* and *gay* representations are comingle in these mass media, most *lesbi* women, like the following Balinese woman, also trace their subjectivities to encounters with mass media: "I didn't use the word *lesbi* because I didn't even know the term [when I was young]. I didn't hear about the word *lesbi* until about 1990, when I read it in a magazine. And right away, when I read about *lesbi* and what that meant, I thought to myself, 'That's me!'"

For these Indonesians, the prerevelatory period of sexual subjectivity is experienced locally; the local is the space of the not-*lesbi* or not-*gay.* The moment when "I knew that was me" has a spatial dimension: they enter not only a sexual self-narrative but a metapragmatics of scale for that narrative. The deictic "I knew that was me" is profoundly translocal, placing the self in a dialogic relationship with a distant but familiar Other.

The role of mass media is also striking because to this day there is little coverage of Indonesian gay men or *lesbi* women. Whereas *waria* see other (Indonesian) *waria* in the mass media, what *gay* and *lesbi* Indonesians usually see is gay and lesbian Westerners. And what they see is not a one-hour special on "Homosexuality in the West." Gay and *lesbi* Indonesians speak of a single fifteen-second coverage of Rock Hudson's AIDS diagnosis on one night in the 1980s, an editorial about Al Pacino's role in the movie *Cruising,* a gossip column about Elton John or Melissa Etheridge, or a short review of *The Wedding Banquet* or *My Best Friend's Wedding* (two films that, like *Cruising,* thematize homosexuality).

Some *lesbi* women and *gay* men actually see such films, either because the films make it onto Indonesian screens or, increasingly, are available on video, but over and over again these Indonesians stress the role of print media, particularly newspapers and women's magazines like *Kartini* and *Femina.* In most cases the references to homosexuality are negative: Indonesian psychologists presenting homosexuality as a pathology or disapproving gossip columns. Sporadic coverage of same-sex scandals and arrests dates back to the early twentieth century. The earliest extensive study of contemporary Indonesian homosexuality to my knowledge, sociologist Amen Budiman's 1979 book *Lelaki Perindu Lelaki* (Men who yearn for men), notes:

In this decade [the 1970s] homosexuality has increasingly become an interesting issue for many segments of Indonesian society. Newspapers, both those published in the capital and in other areas, often present articles and news about homosexuality. In fact, *Berita Buana Minggu* in Jakarta has a special column, "Consultation with a Psychiatrist," which often answers the complaints of those who are homosexual and want to change their sexual orientation. It's the same way with pop magazines, which with increasing diligence produce articles about homosexuality, sometimes even filled with personal stories from homosexual people, complete with their photographs.

Budiman later adds, "It is very interesting to note that homosexuals who originate in the lower classes often try to change their behavior by seeking advice from psychiatric or health columnists in our newspapers and magazines." However, both back in the 1970s and among my present-day informants (a few of whom first became *gay* or *lesbi* in the 1970s or earlier), many *lesbi* and *gay* Indonesians were not changing behavior, but coming to occupy what they saw as legitimate and even in some cases healthy sexualities.
through these mass media. From their beginnings to the present, these media have "exposed" not a fully articulated discourse of homosexuality, but a series of incomplete and contradictory references, in translation, sometimes openly denigrating and hostile. It is not transmission of identity so much as a fractured set of cultural logics reconfigured within Indonesia. Yet, from "translations" of this reportage (so intermittent that Darda could think he was lesbi for years) come subjectivities by which myriad Indonesians live out their lives. There also comes an imagined gay and lesbi community. As in the case of waria, this community is translocal, but unlike waria, it does not end at the national border. Although gay and lesbi individuals do think of themselves as Indonesians—to the point that they use nationalist metaphors of the "archipelago concept" (wanas masyarakat) to conceptualize their community—they also regard themselves as one "island" in a global archipelago of gay and lesbian persons, a constellation including places like Australia and Europe as well as Malaysia and Thailand. They do not regard themselves as a "rerun" of the West; they view themselves as different, but this difference is not seen to create a chasm of incommensurability.22

Gay and lesbi subject-positions thus lead us to a specific sociological problem. Indonesians learn of the possibility of gay or lesbi subjectivities through the intermittent reception of messages from mass media. These messages do not intend to convey the possibility of a kind of selfhood. They are often denigrating and dismissive, but above all they are fragmentary. In the 1980s an Indonesian might encounter such reportage a few times a year at most if an avid reader; in the 1990s, it became more frequent, but still was quite minimal given the universe of topics appearing in the mass media. The question, then, is how modes of subjectivization become established when the social field in which they arise establishes them neither as discourses nor reverse discourses. Indonesian mass media certainly do not intend to set forth the possibility of Indonesian gay and lesbi subject-positions, nor do the imported programs they rebroadcast; in fact, they rarely take a negative stance on Indonesian gay and lesbi subject-positions either. These subject-positions do not appear on the radar screen of these mass media forces as something valorized or condemned; yet it is these forces that, in a very real sense, make gay and lesbi subjectivities possible.

What is needed is a theoretical framework that can account for a con-

The "Problem" of Dubbing

The relationship between mass media and being Indonesian has a long history in the archipelago.23 From the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, print media played a central role in the formation of nationalism among the diverse and far-flung peoples of the Netherlands East Indies. Print media were also important in the establishment of Indonesian (a dialect of Malay formerly used as a lingua franca of trade) as the language of this new imagined community, a language that permitted communication among a populace speaking over six hundred languages.24

In contrast to some other postcolonial states, such as India,23 imports now represent a substantial amount of cinematic and televised fare. Although there is a long tradition of filmmaking in Indonesia dating back to the early twentieth century and at some points garnering massive nationwide audiences, in the late 1990s the Indonesian film industry generally produced only fifteen to twenty films per year, mostly low-budget erotic films that went directly to second- or third-run theaters.25 By the late 1990s each of Indonesia's five private television stations27 was importing approximately seven thousand shows per year, many of which originated in the United States.28

It was in the context of this rise in imported television that, in a joint news conference on April 4, 1996, one year after one of Indonesia's private television stations went national for the first time, Minister of Information
Harmoko and Minister of Education and Culture Wardiman Joyonegoro announced that television stations would be required to dub (dubbing, suluh suara) all foreign shows into the Indonesian language by August 16, in accordance with a soon-to-be-passed broadcasting law, the first set of broadcasting regulations to be issued in eighteen years. This bill, which had been debated in Parliament for several months at that point, was to become one of the most contentious legal documents of the New Order’s twilight years (the “New Order” refers to the thirty-year rule of Soeharto, Indonesia’s second president, which ended in 1998). The requirement that all programs be dubbed into Indonesian was greeted with little fanfare: as the public relations manager of station TPJ noted, many of the programs imported each year by private television stations were already dubbed in response to viewer demand. Acquiescing to the state’s long-standing goal of building nationalism through language planning, the public relations manager of station RCTI added that the requirement was “a good policy that will help build Indonesian skills in society.”

However, within a month of the announcement, a spokesperson from the House of Representatives suggested, “This problem of dubbing is going to be discussed in more depth.” Revealing dissent within the state apparatus, the representative expressed concern that “at present, foreign films on television are not dubbed selectively and show many things that do not fit well with the culture of our people.” The influential armed forces faction also weighed in against the measure, but the House forged ahead, incorporating the dubbing requirement in its Draft Broadcast Law of December 6, 1996.

What made the broadcasting bill such a topic of discussion was the way it was debated and revised, extraordinary even for the typically arcane machinations of the New Order bureaucracy. A first draft of the bill was completed by a legislative committee early in 1996 and sent to Parliament for approval. As usual in the New Order, the bill had been essentially crafted by the president and even bore his initials. In December 1996 Parliament duly rubber-stamped the bill, returning it to Soeharto for his signature. However, after seven months Soeharto dropped a bombshell on July 11, 1997: in an official letter he refused to sign the Draft Broadcast Law and returned it to Parliament for revision, claiming that “several articles will be too difficult to implement from a technical standpoint.” This unconstitutional act was the first time in national history that a president refused to sign a draft law already passed by the House, a refusal made all the more perplexing by his approval of the original bill. House debate on the president’s proposed revisions began on September 18, 1997, and was marked by unusual (for the Soeharto era) interruptions from Parliament members and heated argument over executive-legislative relations.

In the wake of the president’s refusal, government sources gave conflicting accounts of the issues at stake. However, one issue stood out above the others: its cultural, rather than directly economic, emphasis: the edict on dubbing. This issue was notable for the total reversal that occurred during parliamentary revisions. When the dust cleared in December 1997, Article 25 of the Draft Law, concerning dubbing, had been changed to its opposite: all dubbing of foreign television shows into Indonesian was now forbidden; shows must now keep the original language, usually English, and only use Indonesian subtitles. Why? As one apologizer later explained, “Dubbing can create gaps in family communication. It can ruin the self-image of family members as a result of adopting foreign values that are ‘Indonesianized’ [dindonesiakan] . . . This can cause feelings of becoming ‘another person’ to arise in family members, who are in actuality not foreigners. . . . whenever Indonesians view television, films, or other broadcasts where the original language has been changed into our national language, those Indonesians will think that the performances in those media constitute a part of themselves. As if the culture behind those performances is also the culture of our people.”

In the end, the final version of the bill indeed forbids dubbing most foreign programs into the Indonesian language. What is of interest, however, is the debate itself. Why, at this prescient moment in 1997, was the new foreign language media program so significant? What made the decision of Sharon Stone or Jim Carrey to “speak Indonesian” no longer a welcome opportunity to foster linguistic competency but a sinister force threatening the good citizen’s ability to differentiate self from Other? Why would dubbing foreign mass media into Indonesian threaten a national culture so dependent on mass media? Why, even with widespread discontent in many parts of the archipelago, was the state’s fear suddenly recentered not on religious, regional, or ethnic affiliation overwhelming national loyalty, but on transnational affiliation superseding nationalism and rendering it secondary?
We now have two problems centering on mass media: How do Indonesians come to see themselves as gay or lesbi through the fragmentary reception of mass-mediated messages? and Why would the question of dubbing foreign television shows into the Indonesian language provoke a constitutional crisis? Both of these problems raise issues of translation and authenticity in an already globalized, mass-mediated world. I suggest that we might address the first problem through the second. In effect, we can “dub” these two sets of social facts together, and in doing so discover striking convergences and unexpected resonances.26

It was long after becoming aware of the link between mass media and gay/lesbi subjectivities that I learned of the dubbing controversy. I had been struggling with the question of gay/lesbi subjectivities for some time without a clear conclusion, particularly concerning questions of agency. Were gay and lesbi Indonesians puppets of the West? Were they severed from their traditions once they occupied the subject-positions lesbi or gay? After all, as I discuss elsewhere, gay and lesbi Indonesians tend to view themselves in terms of a consumerist life narrative where selfhood is an ongoing project developed through treating one’s life as a kind of career.37 Alternatively, were these Indonesians “queering” global capitalism, subverting its heteronormativity and building a worldwide movement dedicated to human rights? Were they deploying the terms lesbi and gay tactically, as a veneer over a deeper indigeneity?

A notion of dubbing culture allowed me to move beyond this impasse of “puppets of globalization” versus “veneer over tradition.” Through individual encounters with mass media—such as reading one’s mother’s magazine, or an advice column in the local newspaper, or viewing television coverage of a gay pride march in Australia—Indonesians construct subjectivities and communities. “Construct” is the wrong word; it connotes a self who plans and consciously shapes something.38 Better to say that these Indonesians “come to” lesbi and gay subjectivity through these entanglements with mass media; their constructive agency is itself constructed through the encounter.

This is not a solely individual process; whereas originary encounters with magazines or newspapers are typically solitary, as soon as the person begins to interact with other lesbi or gay Indonesians these mass-mediated understandings of sexuality are reworked in a community setting. They are reworked in ways that could not be predicted from the mass media themselves; romance, for instance, is a crucial element of lesbi and gay subjectivities but rarely appears in media treatments of homosexuality. Nor could the reworkings be predicted from the norms of Indonesian society, not only because they lead to homosexual subjectivities, but because through this mass media reportage lesbi women and gay men become linked conceptually and in everyday existence, despite the fact that gender segregation ranges from moderate to pronounced in most of Indonesia. In other words, the idea shared by most lesbi women and gay men that they are elements of a cogenitalized community seems rooted in parallel encounters with mass media.

A set of fragmented cultural elements from mass media is transformed in unexpected ways in the Indonesian context, transforming that “context” itself in the process. In other words, lesbi and gay Indonesians “dub” ostensibly Western sexual subjectivities. Like a dub, the fusion remains a juxtaposition; the seams show. “Speech” and “gesture” never perfectly match; being lesbi or gay and being Indonesian never perfectly match. For lesbi and gay Indonesians, as in dubbing more generally, this tension is irresolvable; there is no “real” version underneath, where everything fits. You can close your eyes and hear perfect speech, or mute the sound and see perfect gesture, but no original unites the two in the dubbed production. However, this may not present the self with an unlivable contradiction, because in dubbing one is invested not in the originary, but in the awkward fusion. Disjunction is at the heart of the dub; there is no prior state of pure synchrony and no simple “conversion” to another way of being. Dubbed culture is a product of localization, and the “message” and sense of “locality” where that message appears are formed at a point that can hardly be called the point of “reception.”39

It is this dimension of dubbing that transcends the apparent dilemma of “puppets of globalization” versus “veneer over tradition.” The idea of dubbing culture indicates that the root of the problem is the notion of authenticity itself, the colonialist depth ontology that layers cultural elements on top of each other and tautologically assigns causal and ontological priority to those already deemed foundational—valorizing the “civilized” colonizer over the “traditional” colonized. In line with the observation that postcolonial nationalisms usually invert, rather than reject entirely, colonial catego-

Tom Boellstorff
the Indonesian state simply flips the colonial binary, placing tradition over modernity as the ultimate justification for the nation.

To the obvious problem of justifying a recently formed nation in terms of tradition, the Indonesian state (like all national states) has worked ever since to inculcate a sense of national culture (kebudayaan nasional). This is built on the pillar of the Indonesian language and propagated via mass media. Through mass media, citizens are to come to recognize themselves as authentic Indonesians, carriers of an oxyomorphic "national tradition" that will guide the body politic through the travails of modernity. By speaking in one voice—in Indonesian—a hierarchy of tradition over modernity can be sustained and reconciled with statehood.

Dubbing threatens this hierarchy; it is lateral, rhizomatic, a multiplicity that cannot be understood in terms of the traditional problems . . . of origins and genesis, or of deep structures. The authoritative voice is at odds with the visual presentation. Dubbing sets two elements side by side, blurred yet distinct. The "original" television show may preexist its Indonesian dub temporally, but to the interpreting audience neither voice nor image is prior. They happen together; neither dominates. Agamben, citing Benjamin's concern with the relationship between quotation and the new "transmissibility of culture" made possible by mass media, notes that quotation "alienat[es] by force a fragment of the past . . . mak[ing] it lose its authentic power." But dubbing (in a literal sense as well as the metaphorical sense I develop here) is more than just quotation; it adds a step, first alienating something and then translating it into a new context. The power of the dub comes not by erasing authenticity, but by inaugurating new authenticities not dependent on tradition. It disrupts the apparent seamlessness of the predubbed "original," showing that it too is a dub, that its "traditions" are the product of social contexts with their own assumptions and inequalities.

The Indonesian authorities were keenly aware of these disruptive implications during the dubbing controversy. For decades, Indonesian had been the vehicle allowing Indonesians to speak with one voice. But now the possibility that Sharon Stone could "speak Indonesian" meant that this vehicle was spinning beyond state control—into the control of globalization forces, but also into an interzone between languages and cultures, a zone with no controlling authority. The sudden shift during the dubbing controversy—from an insistence that all foreign television programs be dubbed into the Indonesian language to an insistence that none of them could be—reveals a tectonic shift in the position of mass media in Indonesian society. For the first time, fear of this juxtaposition, of Westerners "speaking" the national tongue, tipped the scales against a historically privileged concern with propagating Indonesian as national unifier. Now the ability of dubbing (and of the Indonesian language itself) to explore the national imagined community—to show that one can be Indonesian and translate ideas from outside—presented a danger greater than the potential benefit of drawing more sharply the nation's archipelagic edges.

Dubbing culture, then, is about a new kind of cultural translation of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It questions the relationship between translation and belonging, asserting that the binarisms of import-export and authentic-inauthentic are insufficient to explain how globalizing mass media play a role in constituting subject-positions in Asia but do not determine them outright. More broadly, dubbing culture as a metaphor speaks to the nonteleological, transformative dimensions of globalizing processes. In this metaphorical sense we might say that lesbi and gay Indonesians dub Western sexual subject-positions: they "overwrite" the deterministic "voice of the West," yet they cannot compose any script they please; their bricolage remains shaped by a discourse originating in the West and filtered through a nationalistic lens. This process of dubbing allows lesbi and gay individuals to see themselves as part of a global community, but also authentically Indonesian. Unlike varia, they never ask Are there people like me outside Indonesia? because it is already obvious—"built into" the dubbed subjectivities—that there are such people. It is by imagining themselves as one national element in a global patchwork of lesbian and gay national subjectivities, not through tradition, that they see lesbi and gay as transexnic—just as the Indonesian nation presents itself as one of a global community of nations.

The notion of dubbing culture is useful for questioning the ability of globalizing mass media to project uniform "ideologies." Although it is true that contemporary mass media have enormous power, it is crucial to emphasize that this power is not absolute; it can lead to unexpected results, like lesbi and gay subject-positions themselves. The dubbed representation is difficult to interpret as an ideology. In the current climate of interethnic conflict in Indonesia, it bears reflection that lesbi and gay subjectivities are
the New Order's greatest success story, the clearest example of a truly national community, albeit a success story the state never intended.

This metaphorical use of dubbing culture provides a useful fleshing-out of theories linking ideological apparatuses with Althusser's thesis that "ideology interpellates individuals as subjects." By this Althusser meant that ideology forms the subject-positions by which individuals come to represent their conditions of existence to themselves and to others. He terms this function of ideology "interpellation" or "hailing" and illustrates it in terms of a person on the street responding to the hail "Hey, you there!" When the person turns around to respond to the hail, "he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was 'really' addressed to him." Many social theorists, particularly those interested in mass media, have found this a useful analytical starting point. The question most commonly posed to this framework by these theorists is just the issue of structure versus agency that I noted earlier: "Although there would be no turning around without first having been hailed, neither would there be a turning around without some readiness to turn. But... how and why does the subject turn, anticipating the conferral of identity through the self-ascription of guilt? What kind of relation already binds these two such that the subject knows to turn, knows that something is to be gained from such a turn?" Part and parcel of this dilemma of agency is the question How are we to explain the circumstance when people "recognize" something the ideology does not intend?

One way to address this problem might be through the dubbing culture concept, where what is "recognized" in the hail is itself a product of reception, translation, and interpretation, bundled together. This does not entail compliance with state ideology (a necessary caveat because lesbi and gay Indonesians are not hailed as such by the state). Yet neither does it imply a freewheeling, presocial, liberal self able to assemble any old identity from elements presented by mass media, independent of social context.

Lesbi and lesbi Indonesians often playfully employ the notion of authenticity (asli), sometimes even describing themselves as asli gay. In doing so, they implicitly challenge the state's monopoly on designating what will count as tradition in Indonesia. This question of authenticity is crucial for mass media studies as well. For Benjamin, the very concept of authenticity is put under erasure by mass media. Because mass media depend on mechanical reproduction (no mass media circulate as a series of hand-crafted originals) and for Benjamin "the presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity," it follows that "the whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical... reproducibility." Benjamin sees the most significant aspect of this reproducibility to be that of movement: "Above all, [technical reproduction] enables the original to meet the beholder halfway... the cathedral leaves its locale to be received in the studio of a lover of art; the choral production, performed in an auditorium or in the open air, resounds in the drawing room." 

Lesbi and lesbi Indonesians are dubbing culture because they embody subjectivities neither of tradition nor of simple importations from "outside." They are the outside inside, reconfigured. Such Indonesians claim authenticity not in the key of indigeneity but in the key of transformation, much as the Indonesian nation itself is the transformed Netherlands East Indies.

Gay and lesbi subjectivities are not moved from one place to another, as Benjamin saw mechanical reproduction, but are the dubbing of cultural logics in new ways. Dubbing culture is thus articulation in both senses of the term: an interaction of elements that remain distinct—like the image of speech and the doubled voice—and also the "speaking" of a subjectivity. This lets us "queer" globalization without posing an oppositionally authentic "native." After all, lesbi and lesbi Indonesians rarely see themselves as "queering" the state-society nexus in an oppositional sense; rather, they see themselves as beating this nexus at its own game, as more national than general society itself.

Dubbing culture also speaks to translation in the age of mechanical production. As Benjamin notes with reference to magazines, "For the first time, captions have become obligatory. And it is clear that they have an altogether different character than the title of a painting." This is because captions are a guide to interpretation, juxtaposed to the work of art yet at a slight remove. They serve as "signposts" that "demand a specific kind of approach." They are a mediation internal to mass media, a translation within.

Dubbing, far more than a subtitle, is a caption fused to the thing being described. It comes from the mouth of imaginary characters, yet is never quite in sync. The moving lips never match the speech; the moment of fusion is always deferred as dubbed voice, translation-never-quite-complete, bridging two sets of representations. Gay and lesbi Indonesians dub culture as they live a subjectivity linked to people and places far away. They are corn-
completely Indonesian, but to be “completely Indonesian” requires thinking of one’s position in a transnational world.

In speaking of translation, Benjamin wrote: “Unlike a work of literature, translation does not find itself in the center of the language forest but on the outside facing the wooded ridge; it calls into it without entering, aiming at that single spot where the echo is able to give, in its own language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one.” gay and lesbi Indonesians have made of that echo subject-positions that speak subjectivity and community even under conditions of oppression. They live in the echo, in the mass-mediated margin of incomplete translation, and find there authenticity, meaning, friendship, and love.

In dubbing culture, lesbi and gay Indonesians show not that “authentic Indonesian tradition” is a lie, but that this authenticity is processual, constructed through active engagement with an unequal world of mass media, nationalism, and the global ecumene. And if tradition and belonging are not given but constructed, they can be contested and transformed. The playing field is certainly not even—lesbi and gay Indonesians are not about to become fully accepted members of Indonesian society—but it is a playing field nonetheless, and there is space for change. In the interstices of mass media and the contradictions of local experience in a global imaginary, new ways of living, loving, conforming, but also resisting, enter the world.

Notes

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I follow standard Indonesian orthography except that the front unrounded vowel /ɛ/ (spelled “e” in Indonesian, along with the schwa) is here written “ê” for clarity. All informant names are pseudonyms.

However, tomboi is not universally embodied in a masculine fashion; in southern Sulawesi there are tomboi with long hair who wear dresses yet identify as tomboi.

The use of tomboi for butch lesbi in Sumatra may lead to confusion, because generally in Indonesia tomboi refers to a girl who engages in boy's activities (much like English “tomboy”). For instance, in a television commercial shown nationally in Indonesia in 2000, a mother comments on her favorite brand of laundry detergent as her young daughter of about 8 is shown walking home from school wearing a school uniform and also a jilbab (a veil worn by many Muslim Indonesians that covers the head and hair but not the face). As the little girl runs home from school, getting dirt and later chocolate ice cream on her jilbab, the mother opines, “My girl is a real tomboi.” The ambivalence over the term tomboi in many regions of Indonesia is also indicated by statements from lesbi women in both Bali and Sulawesi that “not all tomboi are lesbi, and not all lesbi are tomboi.”

Among other factors, this is because these zines have a limited, informal circulation. See Boellstorff, “Zines and Zones of Mediated Love, National Romance, and Sexual Citizenship in Gay and Lesbian Indonesia.” Unpublished manuscript, n.d.


This seems possible despite the fact that lesbi and gay Indonesians themselves tended not to take much notice of the dubbing controversy. I have never heard a gay or lesbi (or waria) Indonesian bring up the topic. When I have explicitly asked them about the controversy, gay and lesbi Indonesians both respond that they prefer subtitles to dubbing for the following reasons: you can learn the original language, "even if it is just 'Buenos Dias' in Spanish," and the dubbing "never follows the actor's lips exactly." A discussion of the more general public reaction to the dubbing controversy is beyond the scope of this essay; see Jones.

As would "narrative," these subjectivities are not negotiated in the sense that Maira speaks of an "identity dub" among South Asian Americans in the New York club scene: Susanina Maira, "Identity Dub: The Paradox of an Indian American Youth Subculture (New York Mix)," Cultural Anthropology 14, no. 1 (1999): 29–60. In that case, the institutional context is not mass media but chubbing, and the individuals involved appear to be vastly more wealthy, English-speaking, and mobile than gay and lesbi Indonesians.

Dubbing culture is thus a postcolonial heir to the colonial dynamic between translation and conversion that Rafael explores in the Philippines, "the particular ways by which those boundaries that differentiate the inside from the outside of native societies are historically drawn, expanded, contracted, or obscured." Vicente L. Rafael, Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 15.


Here I use "articulation" in its English sense. The term originally entered social theory through Marx, but Gliederung has only the first of the two meanings noted above. The root word, Glied, means "limb" or "joint" but can also mean "penis" (männliches Glied). Surely there is great potential in a psychoanalytic treatment that links the moment of speech to erection—the "movement" of the phallus.


As Liu notes in her study of translilingual practice in China, in studying how "a word, category, or discourse 'travels from one language to another,' we must "account for the vehicle of translation" and address "the condition of translation" itself. Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 26.